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The use of analogy is an important component of human cognition. The type of analogy
we produce and communicate depends heavily on a number of factors, such as the
setting, the level of domain expertise present, and the speaker’s goal or intent. In this
observational study, we recorded economics experts during scientific discussion and
examined the categorical distance and structural depth of the analogies they produced.
We also sought to characterize the purpose of the analogies that were generated. Our
results supported previous conclusions about the infrequency of superficial similarity in
subject-generated analogs, but also showed that distance and depth characteristics were
more evenly balanced than in previous observational studies. This finding was likely due
to the nature of the goals of the participants, as well as the broader nature of their
expertise. An analysis of analogical purpose indicated that the generation of concrete
source examples of more general target concepts was most prevalent. We also noted
frequent instances of analogies intended to form visual images of source concepts. Other
common purposes for analogies were the addition of colorful speech, inclusion (i.e.,
subsumption) of a target into a source concept, or differentiation between source and
target concepts. We found no association between depth and either of the other two
characteristics, but our findings suggest a relationship between purpose and distance; i.e.,
that visual imagery typically entailed an outside-domain source whereas exemplification
was most frequently accomplished using within-domain analogies. Overall, we observed a
rich and diverse set of spontaneously produced analogical comparisons. The high degree
of expertise within the observed group along with the richly comparative nature of the
economics discipline likely contributed to this analogical abundance.
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INTRODUCTION
The importance of analogy has been described in many ways by
notable researchers. Polya (1957) wrote that analogy “pervades
all our thinking,” Holyoak et al. (2001) called it “a central com-
ponent of human cognition,” and Hofstadter (2001) referred to
it as “the lifeblood . . . of human thinking.” Because of its per-
ceived importance in cognitive functioning, the use of analogy in
thought and language has been studied extensively in cognitive
psychology, cognitive development, and cognitive science since
the early 1980s. Research examining analogical production and
retrieval under experimental conditions has provided a wealth of
valuable data. Far fewer studies of these important phenomena
have been conducted in naturalistic settings.
The importance of studying analogical production “in the
wild” was emphasized by one of its most prominent researchers.
Just as it is necessary to conduct both in vivo and in vitro stud-
ies to fully understand biological phenomena, Dunbar (1995,
2001) argued that it is likewise necessary to conduct both
naturalistic and experimental studies in cognitive research to
fully understand the cognitive processes involved in reason-
ing and analysis. He modeled his approach after techniques
applied in biological research, referring to this paradigm as
“in vivo/in vitro.” Observing behavior in naturalistic settings
provides several advantages: (a) behaviors are unconstrained by
laboratory conditions and are not instigated by artificial or exper-
imental stimuli, (b) the setting emphasizes processes rather than
outcomes, and (c) there is a clear relationship between observed
behaviors and the domain of interest (Dunbar, 1995; Crano
and Brewer, 2002). These conditions are particularly important
when investigating analogical thinking which involves linking
one’s current context with prior knowledge in a spontaneous
fashion. It is important to note, however, that the observational
approach lacks the superior structure and clarity of laboratory-
based experiments.
Because there are many commonly used definitions of the term
analogy, we felt it necessary to offer a clear definition that captures
the essential characteristics applied by researchers in this field.
A frequently used means of conveying an understanding of an
unfamiliar concept is by drawing a comparison to similar, more
familiar concepts. An analogy conveys more than literal similarity
between two objects or concepts (Gentner, 1983). As a process,
analogy involves the search for and selection of a well-understood
source from long-termmemory, followed by the transfer of mean-
ing from that source to a less familiar target (Spellman and
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Holyoak, 1996). The set of correspondences between a source and
target are referred to as a source-target mapping. In contrast to
other forms of likeness or similarity, analogy is based on a com-
parison of structural relations, or systems of relations, rather than
a mere resemblance of surface properties or attributes (Gentner
andMarkman, 1997). A system of relations can be quite complex,
and all of its mappings may not be apparent. Some evidence sug-
gests, however, that analogical mapping is not entirely relational
(Ball et al., 2004; Bearman et al., 2007).
In the current study, we applied Dunbar’s in vivo approach
to observe and analyze some of the characteristics of source
analogs produced during live, open discussion involving prob-
lems in economics and discuss some of the factors influencing
their production. We chose a behavioral economics group to
observe, as economists seek to broadly explain complex real-
world human behavior in the context of models, games, and
examples. All of these techniques rely heavily upon comparisons
between different states of the world, different types of behav-
ior, and combinations of models and situations. Many of these
comparisons are potentially analogical, drawing heavily upon
the expertise of the individual and the broader group. Data
were collected from the weekly sessions of an economics read-
ing group, which consisted of participants whose expertise in the
broad field of economics varied in terms of depth and academic
specialization.
ANALOGICAL DEPTH
One of the factors that has been shown to influence source
retrieval is the level, or depth, of similarity between a target and
the chosen source. Past research has shown that source-to-target
mapping is primarily driven by the comparison of structural
relations between source and target concepts but retrieval may
be facilitated by superficial characteristics (Gick and Holyoak,
1980, 1983; Gentner et al., 1993; Forbus et al., 1997). In other
words, people will rely on structural details to find appropriate
sources when mapping an analogy, but perhaps find it easier to
rely on overlapping surface features in addition to underlying
structure when retrieving a correspondence (Holyoak and Koh,
1987; Holyoak and Thagard, 1995; Dunbar, 2001). The use of
superficial characteristics for comparison is particularly apparent
when source and target analogs are generated a priori and pro-
vided to an individual, who must then consider the nature of the
relationship or relationships.
When people generate their own analogies by drawing upon
their own knowledge, research has shown that fewer super-
ficial similarities between analogs are observed. Studies by
Dunbar (1995, 1997) and Blanchette and Dunbar (1997, 2000,
2001) revealed that more than half of the analogies pro-
duced during biology laboratory meetings and political dis-
course, respectively, showed no apparent surface similarity.
The Bearman et al. (2007) management study showed that
73% of analogies were only structural in nature. With this
in mind, the first goal of this study was to examine the
depth of analogies produced by economics experts during sci-
entific discourse. Results were expected to show infrequent sur-
face feature overlap and provide additional support for earlier
findings.
ANALOGICAL DISTANCE
A second important feature in analogy use concerns the range, or
distance, between the domains of the source and target analogs.
Dunbar (1995) defined three categories of analogy in terms of
their degree of domain separation: (a) long-distance describes a
source drawn from a very different domain (also referred to as
outside-domain, or out-of-category), (b) regional refers to a source
mapped from a similar domain (e.g., economics to finance or
public administration), and (c) local maps a target to a source
in the same domain. Both local and regional classes are collec-
tively referred to as within-domain, or within-category. Because of
the subjective nature of judging domain distance between similar
domains, many observational studies simply categorize analo-
gies using a binary choice of within-category or outside-category.
Analogies formed within the same category might compare bio-
logical organisms or investment strategies, while commonly refer-
enced domains for outside-category analogies include sports (e.g.,
one might fail and “strike out at the plate” or succeed and “push
the ball over the goal line”) and the supernatural (e.g., “it works
so well that it’s like magic”).
Research on the domain separation of analogies has pro-
vided contrasting results. Dunbar’s studies of scientific reasoning
set in microbiology laboratories showed heavy use of within-
category analogies—98% of the analogies generated were clas-
sified as either local or regional (Dunbar, 1995, 1997). A study
by Saner and Schunn (1999) produced a similar but narrower
finding—researchers in psychology laboratory meetings and col-
loquia made frequent use of analogies, and more than 75% of
them were within the same domain. In contrast, Blanchette and
Dunbar found that 77% of the analogies that appeared in political
articles aimed at more general audiences were outside-category
(2001). Christensen and Schunn’s, 2007 engineering design group
study showed a more balanced mix of analogies—55% were
within-category while 45% were outside-category.
One explanation for the difference in domain distance is that
the collective expertise of the audiencemay influence the selection
of analogy. When addressing other domain experts with special-
ized knowledge, within-category analogs may prove more effec-
tive whereas an outside-domain analogy might be more attractive
choice for a general audience. The type of task or function per-
formed by the analogizer is another possible constraint. Our
second goal was to observe the use of within- and outside-domain
analogies produced by the economics experts. We expected to
find a fairly balanced use of both styles, which differs somewhat
from earlier findings. Our expectation was motivated by the dif-
ferent subdomains and varying levels of subject expertise within
the reading group. Furthermore, in light of the stated belief that
within-domain analogies tend to involve a higher degree of super-
ficial similarity than outside-domain analogies, we investigated
whether such a relationship emerged.
ANALOGICAL PURPOSE
Thirdly, past research has shown that the goal of the individ-
ual producing the analogy is likely to influence the process of
selection and transfer (Spellman andHolyoak, 1996). Prior obser-
vational studies have examined the types of goals that emerge
from the production of analogies, and the goals themselves
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tend to be highly domain-specific and task-specific. For exam-
ple, the four goals derived from the microbiology laboratories
by Dunbar (1995, 1997) were: forming hypotheses, designing
experiments, modifying experiments, and explaining issues and
concepts to other scientists. The management decision-making
study by Bearman et al. (2002) identified only two goals: problem-
solving and illustration. Similarly, the Christensen and Schunn
(2007) study of analogizing during engineering design meetings
reported three functions: identifying problems, solving problems,
and explaining concepts. Our economics reading group differed
in its function from the settings of the studies mentioned above.
The purpose of the group was limited to explaining and under-
standing experiments performed by other researchers; i.e., the
experts in our observational study critiqued experimental designs
and analyzed results.
Blanchette and Dunbar (2001) provided evidence that goals
influenced the choice of analogy. When supporting a favor-
able position, emotionally positive analogies were more com-
monly chosen over those displaying negative emotional ideas.
Conversely, when criticizing an unfavorable position, emotion-
ally negative analogies were more frequent. Because analogical
retrieval appears subject to the influence of the purpose for which
it was produced, our third goal was to analyze the range of goals
that emerge from the use of analogies by the economics group and
their potential effect on analogical distance and depth.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The setting for this study was the School of Economic, Political,
and Policy Sciences (EPPS) weekly reading group at The
University of Texas at Dallas during the Spring semester of 2011.
Participants included male and female reading group attendees.
The average weekly attendance was approximately 20 partici-
pants, which included both faculty members (∼25%) and gradu-
ate students (∼75%). The group was largely the same from week
to week, but attendance did fluctuate and not all participants
attended regularly. Participants’ academic expertise was mixed,
and included sub-disciplines such as econometrics, experimen-
tal economics, and game theory. A few of the attendees had no
exposure to experimental methods.
The sessions were conducted in typical reading group fash-
ion. One of the senior faculty members acted as the group’s
moderator, and one student participant was assigned each week
to lead the following week’s discussion of one or more chosen
research papers. Following a brief presentation of the paper by the
assigned student, a free and open discussion followed in which the
members of the group examined and dissected the experimental
methods and results described in the paper.
PROCEDURE
Session recordings
The investigator attended and made audio recordings at each of
five groupmeetings, but did not participate in the discussions and
appeared to have minimal impact on group interaction. Group
members understood that their discussions would be evaluated
(the moderator referred to it as “the science behind the science”).
The research goal of examining the spontaneous use of analogies
was not revealed, however. Although each session was scheduled
to last for 90min, actual discussion times ranged from 65 to
110min. In all, approximately 7 h of discourse were recorded.
Transcription procedure
Four transcribers participated in the initial processing of
the discourse—the primary author and three undergraduate
Psychology students. Only the primary author and one of the
undergraduates had any significant transcription experience prior
to the task. None of the undergraduate transcribers had expo-
sure to Economics beyond introductory coursework. Transcribers
were given instruction by the primary author on what consti-
tutes an analogy based on the definitions presented earlier in this
paper, then solved practice problems on recognizing analogies
from non-analogies by identifying sources and targets. The period
of instruction lasted approximately 30min.
For purposes of indoctrination, each undergraduate tran-
scriber was given one of the sessions for practice and directed to
process at least 30min of the recording. They were instructed to
transcribe passages in which a possible analogy was made, taking
care to include all of the important source and target informa-
tion. Their instruction was: “when in doubt, include it.” The
primary author evaluated their performance andmade individual
adjustments until the results were satisfactory and consistent.
To address the possibility of subtle, easily-overlooked analo-
gies, every audio recording was processed by two transcribers.
To be included for analysis, a passage needed only to appear on
either transcriber’s log, not both. In order to be missed, a pas-
sage would have to have been heard by both transcribers and
rejected.
Coding procedure
The two authors performed the coding duties. Both were expe-
rienced coders with strong knowledge of analogy literature and
considerable research experience. Each of the transcribed seg-
ments was first evaluated for the presence of one or more analo-
gies based on the definition stated earlier. Comparisons based
only on literal similarities were considered non-analogies. If a seg-
ment was judged to contain no analogy, no further evaluation was
performed. If an analogy was deemed present, the source, target,
source domain, and target domain of the analogy were recorded.
Each analogy was then coded along the three dimensions of
distance, depth, and purpose.
Both coders rated the entire set and reliability was calculated
for each dimension. Distance was rated using the commonly
applied within-domain and outside-domain categories. Following
the example of Saner and Schunn (1999) in which the authors
collapsed all psychology-related categories into “within-domain,”
we likewise considered all analogies related to economics, finance,
statistics, probabilities, and game theory to be in the same
domain. Depth was rated as superficial if the source and target
shared surface characteristics; if not, it was rated as structural.
Two passes were made by each coder to rate the purpose. The
first pass was used to generate and agree on a list of functions
represented by the set of analogies. Then, the coders used the list
from the first pass as set of categories for rating analogies in the
second pass.
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RESULTS
SEGMENT TRANSCRIPTION AND ANALOGY EXTRACTION
Transcription of the five recorded sessions yielded 114 unique
passages with possible analogies (M = 16.29 analogy segments
per hour). See Appendix A for a sampling of extracted pas-
sages. When judging whether a passage contained an analogy,
the coders agreed on 96% (n = 109) of the 114 passages. Of
these, most were rated as containing an analogy (n = 91, 83%).
Passages lacking the basic ingredients of an analogy (i.e., source-
target mapping and knowledge transfer) or showing evidence of
a literal comparison (n = 18, 17%) were eliminated. Five pas-
sages were inconclusive and were likewise eliminated. The inter-
rater reliability for identifying analogies was strong (κ = 0.85).
Some of the passages were found to contain multiple analo-
gies. In all, 97 analogies were extracted for the remainder of this
analysis.
ANALOGICAL DEPTH
In coding for analogical depth, the coders agreed on 91%
(n = 88) of the 97 analogies. Of these, analogies showing no
obvious overlap in surface characteristics (n = 69, 78%) far
outnumbered those where superficial similarities were present
(n = 19, 22%). The inter-rater reliability was found to be
substantial (κ = 0.75).
ANALOGICAL DISTANCE
In coding for analogical distance, the coders agreed on 86%
(n = 83) of the 97 analogies. Of these, within-domain (n = 44,
53%) and outside-domain (n = 39, 47%) analogies were almost
evenly distributed. The inter-rater reliability was again found to
be substantial (κ = 0.71).
ANALOGICAL PURPOSE
At stated above, we did not impose a priori categorical restric-
tions on coding for analogical purpose. Rather, the coders were
free to make subjective judgments as to the intent of the speaker
on the first pass through the data. From these impressions, we
grouped similar items and derived a set of categories for coding
the analogies on the second pass. The derived taxonomy of rating
categories was as follows: Differentiation (highlighting differences
between source and target), Inclusion (indicating that the target
was a type or component of the source), Example (indicating that
the target was an instance of the source concept), Visualization
(intended to create a picture or image in the mind of the audi-
ence), Emotion (appealing to feelings of the audience, or drawing
on the emotion of the expert), Critique (using the source to point
out shortcomings in the target), Exaggeration (gratuitous use of
colorful phrasing), and Abstraction (broaden the target concept
using amore general source concept). Where an analogy plausibly
served multiple purposes, the raters chose the strongest.
In coding for analogical purpose, the coders agreed on 79%
(n = 77) of the 97 analogies. Examples were the most prevalent
(n = 27, 35%), followed by visualizations (n = 19, 25%). A fair
number of exaggerations (n = 11, 14%), inclusions (n = 9, 12%),
and differentiations (n = 8, 10%) were observed, but abstrac-
tions (n = 2, 3%) and critiques (n = 1, 1%) were uncommon.
The inter-rater reliability for analogical purpose was substantial
(κ = 0.74).
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DEPTH AND DISTANCE
As reported above, most of the analogies were rated as struc-
tural analogies. Of those, there was an even distribution of
outside-domain (n = 31, 50%) and within-domain (n = 31,
50%) analogies. The superficial analogies were likewise split
between outside-domain (n = 7, 54%) and within-domain (n =
6, 46%). It was determined that there was no significant distance-
depth association [χ2(1,N = 75) = 0.06, p = 0.80], suggesting that
the two variables are independent.
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DEPTH AND PURPOSE
Almost half of the analogies were rated as either structural-
example (n = 18, 25%) or structural-visualization analogies (n =
16, 23%). Though the distribution of purpose ratings was highly
skewed, it was skewed similarly over both categories of analogi-
cal depth and no significant depth-purpose association was found
[χ2(7,N = 71) = 8.74, p = 0.27]. This finding suggests that these
two variables are also independent.
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DISTANCE AND PURPOSE
In contrast to the two findings above, an examination of analog-
ical distance as a function of the speaker’s purpose did reveal a
significant association [χ2(7,N = 66) = 34.94, p < 0.005]. When a
speaker sought to produce an analogy that created a visual image,
an out-of-domain source was typically selected (n = 16, 24%).
On the other hand, when an analogizing by example, a source-
target transfer fromwithin the same domain was most commonly
observed (n = 18, 27%).
DISCUSSION
The most prominent observation to come from this study was
that the use of analogy for exploration and explanation among
economics experts and students was rich and abundant. In
427min of discourse, 97 analogies were extracted, suggesting that
analogies are both commonly used and serve as an important
component in human reasoning and in understanding prob-
lems. The reading group setting enabled the observation of actual
experts spontaneously forming analogies using their semantic
knowledge applied to economics, a domain likely to entail more
freedom tomove between and among domains of knowledge than
the previously investigated biology and political domains. The
selection and fluid assembly of analogies during discourse may
help to reveal the core principles involved in analogical think-
ing among experts. This study’s findings will be discussed in the
context of prior evidence.
EXPERTS IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS
We chose to study behavioral economics experts in this study.
Economists seek to broadly explain complex real-world human
behavior in the context of equations, models, games, and hypo-
thetical examples. All of these techniques rely heavily upon com-
parisons between different states of the world, different types of
behavior, and combinations ofmodels and situations.While some
feature or object-based similarity occurs in comparisons between
economic models and real-world behavior, it can be argued that
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the majority of the comparisons are about relations and sys-
tems of relations. For example, in the economic UltimatumGame
(Guth et al., 1982), two individuals each make monetary deci-
sions that will be reviewed and reacted to by the other. The
Ultimatum Game can be compared to many situations in life
in which banks, individuals, or nations either choose to coop-
erate or not with regard to money, goods, or military action.
Thus, many of the comparisons used in behavioral economics are
likely to be analogical and may occur with greater frequency than
observed in laboratory settings. The expertise of the individuals
involved in behavioral economics discussions and expertise levels
of the broader group are likely to encourage potentially rich and
relationally deep analogies.
Expertise was a critical element to this study, as the role
of domain knowledge in analogy production is not yet well
understood. The level of expertise among reading group partic-
ipants varied, but all had sufficient knowledge to be considered
experts in the field. In some observational studies, expertise was
narrowly concentrated [Dunbar’s (1995, 1997) molecular biol-
ogy group], whereas in others, general audiences possessed little
to no domain knowledge [e.g., Blanchette and Dunbar (2001)
political news study]. In our economics reading group, the exper-
tise was both deep and broad, covering a range of specializa-
tions such as experimental economics, econometrics, and game
theory.
There is growing evidence that the depth of expertise of the
audience may influence analogical selection. It is reasonable to
hypothesize that the breadth of expertise may contribute, as well.
Blanchette and Dunbar (2001) showed more frequent use of
outside-domain analogies when the intended audience consisted
of non-experts and correspondingly more prevalent within-
domain analogies among fellow experts. Additionally, experts
appear more likely to exploit the complex relational nature of
analogies while avoiding the tendency to rely on superficial fea-
tures for comparison. The findings of Bearman et al. (2007)
suggested that experts tend to compare structural relationships
in all activities but novices show differences; i.e., when engaged
in problem solving activities, novices rely on structural analogies
but incorporate superficial features in their comparisons when
illustrating or explaining.
We based our depth and distance expectations for this study
largely on these findings.We did, as expected, observe amore even
distribution of distance in analogies and infrequent use of super-
ficial features in making comparisons. Relative to novices, experts
can draw on a great deal of accumulated knowledge when think-
ing and reasoning (Bearman et al., 2007). It stands to reason that
they are better able to exploit the deep, structural nature of source
information as a result. Non-experts, on the other hand, lack the
same deep encoding of domain information and may need to rely
more heavily on superficial characteristics. The evidence is incon-
sistent, however; the Blanchette and Dunbar (2000) study points
to novice use of structure as well.
ANALOGICAL DEPTH—SUPERFICIAL VS. STRUCTURAL
Structural correspondences in the underlying system of relations
between source and target elements represent an important com-
ponent of analogies. Past experimental research demonstrated
that superficial features influence the selection of source analogs
(Gick and Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Gentner et al., 1993; Forbus
et al., 1997), and studies in naturalistic settings suggest that other
factors may contribute, as well (Blanchette and Dunbar, 2001;
Bearman et al., 2007). The ratings from this study showed that
the economics experts relied primarily on structural components
of analogies (78%) with infrequent use of superficial feature
comparisons (22%).
The data collected from the reading group sessions contained a
dense set of complex comparisons rich in structure. Because of the
unconstrained, yet guided, nature of the discussion, participants
experienced a great deal of freedom to explore, compare, and
explain complex target concepts. The reading group setting had
certain features of prior story-based analogical reminding studies
(Gentner et al., 1993; Wharton et al., 1994; Catrambone, 1997),
as participants compared the contents of journal papers and the
various experimental methods they described. The setting also
had characteristics of the Blanchette and Dunbar “production
paradigm” studies (2001) in which participants generated source
analogs from their own knowledge and experiences. Perhaps not
all settings are completely retrieval-based or production-based;
rather, the degree to which the activity combines retrieval tasks
with production tasks may determine the balance of analogical
depth applied. Additionally, the occasional use of superficial com-
parisons likely reflects a tendency to spark heightened interest by
making a link to a distant analogous domain during their descrip-
tions of economic processes. Indeed, some of the surface-level
analogies tabulated could be considered to be turns of phrase or
metaphorical comparisons. The use of such comparisons can be
helpful in making speech more interesting to the listener and to
add points of common reference periodically.
ANALOGICAL DISTANCE—WITHIN DOMAIN VS. OUTSIDE DOMAIN
One possible explanation for the observed balance between
within-category and out-of-category analogies was that subject
matter expertise shared among a speaker and audience influenced
source selection. Observational data offer support to this hypoth-
esis. In Dunbar’s (1995, 1997) biology laboratory study, scientists
overwhelmingly produced within-domain analogies (98%). Saner
and Schunn (1999) also observed high rates of within-domain
analogies in their study of psychology laboratory meetings (81%
within-domain) and colloquia (77% within-domain). In con-
trast, Blanchette and Dunbar (2001) studied opinion articles in
the mainstream press, where the audience was the population at
large. Here, they found that most analogies (77%) were from out-
side the target domain. Based on these findings, it appears that
experts produce more within-domain analogies when commu-
nicating knowledge to their fellow subject matter experts, but
generate analogies from sources from other domains when the
audience consists of non-experts.
A second, but related, explanation stated that the goals of
the participants were an influencing factor on source distance
(Dunbar, 1995; Holyoak and Thagard, 1997; Blanchette and
Dunbar, 2001). In Dunbar’s biology lab study, the scientists were
heavily focused on examining unexpected experimental results
and resolving methodological problems. However, in the Dunbar
and Blanchette studies involving both experts and non-experts,
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the experts’ goals were to educate and/or persuade. In our study,
there was no “discovery task”—i.e., there were no new hypotheses
being generated, no new designs being developed, and no prob-
lems being solved. Rather, the discussion involved a great deal of
comparison, both integrating and differentiating details of exper-
imental methods and results. It may be that tasks involving a
greater amount of creativity or innovation lead to more frequent
use of same-domain analogies.
The results from the current study were more balanced. Out-
of-category analogies were observed most frequently (53%), but
within-category analogies accounted for a sizeable portion of the
total as well (47%). These results fall squarely between the pre-
vious findings, but a plausible explanation can be made. If the
number of within- and outside-domain analogies is a function
of expertise, then the balance between them might be expected
to vary with the range and depth of expertise. In the EPPS
reading group, the participants all had some degree of expertise
in economics, but their domain experience varied in terms of
sub-discipline (e.g., econometrics, game theory, behavioral eco-
nomics) and academic career longevity (i.e., faculty or graduate
student). Hence, common expertise is likely to be an influenc-
ing factor, as Dunbar suggested, but the amount of influence it
has on source distance may moderated by the variability in such
factors as range and depth. Additionally, the goals of the partici-
pants differed from those in earlier studies. Here, the participants
sought to comprehend papers describing experimental methods
and results, often by comparing unfamiliar methods to known,
more familiar ones. To accomplish these goals, perhaps a more
balanced and diverse set of analogies is most effective.
Another possibility for explaining the balance between within-
and outside-domain analogies that we observed is concerns the
economics discipline itself. In Dunbar’s (1995, 1997) biology
lab observations, the overwhelming number of within-domain
analogies may have stemmed from the fact that a majority of situ-
ations in molecular biology are likely to have clear relational cor-
respondences to closely related areas within biological research,
rather than remote domains comprised of non-molecular ele-
ments. Meanwhile, the Blanchette and Dunbar (2001) study of
political commentary suggested that politicians and journalists
appeared to draw intentionally from remote domains that would
be familiar to readers in ways intended to highlight certain aspects
of relational comparisons. In the present study, discussions across
the relatively broad domain of economic inquiry highlighted
the technical overlap between its various subdomains. Unlike
molecular biology, economics has a high potential for relational
alignment tomore remote domains within public policy, banking,
and corporate practice, domains in which human behavior, mon-
etary valuations, and world affairs converge. Thus, the complexity
of economics, which plays out both in academic analytic settings
and in real-world financial markets, appears to provide a rich
field optimal for both within-domain and out-of-domain ana-
logical comparisons. Given the complicated nature of economic
systems, economic analogies are rarely complete, so both superfi-
cial and structural correspondences appear to be drawn upon in
order to explain and describe various aspects of complex systems.
The validity or appropriateness of analogies in economics may
also be subject to greater interpretation than other domains given
our limitations in fully explaining human behavior and market
dynamics.
In terms of a possible relationship between distance and
depth, it has been suggested that within-domain analogies
present more superficial similarity than distant analogies; in
other words, the greater the distance, the less superficial the
comparison (Christensen and Schunn, 2007). However, we
found no evidence of that constraint in our observation of
economists.
ANALOGICAL PURPOSE
It is fairly well established that goals influence the production
of analogies (Dunbar, 1995, 1997; Spellman and Holyoak, 1996;
Blanchette and Dunbar, 2001). Prior studies examined the goals
of experts in scientific laboratories in both discovery (e.g., prob-
lem solving, hypothesis generation, experimental design) and
non-discovery (e.g., explanation, illustration, or visualization)
activities. The primary difference in purpose between the eco-
nomics reading group and groups observed in the cited studies
was the absence of discovery goals in the reading group. Since we
determined that the discussions we observed were largely non-
discovery in nature, we focused on categorizing the extracted
analogies into groupings based on the perceived reason for select-
ing the particular analogy; e.g., to differentiate a concept from
other concepts, to inject emotion or colorful language into a com-
parison, to give a concrete example of a more abstract idea, etc.
The list we derived can be found in the Results section above.
Blanchette and Dunbar (2001) provided evidence that goals
influence analogical production, but the goals of the individuals
in their study appeared to have no effect on analogical distance.
Saner and Schunn (1999), on the other hand, found that goals did
impact the domain distance. In particular, they found that indi-
viduals used within-domain analogies when working to identify
problems but used outside-domain analogies when explaining
issues or concepts to their lab mates. In our study, too, the
purpose-distance effect was significant. Exemplification was asso-
ciated with within-domain analogizing, while visualization was
strongly related to out-of-domain analogy use. It may be that the
functions that result in within-domain analogies (i.e., problem
identification, generation of concrete examples) share some of
the same underlying cognitive operations, as do those that pro-
duce outside-domain analogies (i.e., explaining issues, visualizing
concepts), in ways that influence the generation and retrieval of
analogies.
In interpreting our results, we should mention that the cate-
gories we developed were not mutually exclusive; e.g., an analogy
intended to differentiate between concepts might do so using
visual elements. In cases where an analogy plausibly served multi-
ple purposes, the raters chose the category they felt best described
its purpose.
GENERAL DISCUSSION ON THE RICHNESS OF OBSERVED ANALOGIES
We have already emphasized that the collected passages con-
tained a wealth of analogies rich in depth and structure, many of
which involved implied systems of complex relations that could
not be fully identified and analyzed. Furthermore, some of the
more complex comparisons actually involved multiple analogies
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at different distances and depths. The challenges we faced in
terms of analyzing the passages were made more difficult due to
the complexities of the structural and superficial analogies used.
Unlike laboratory tasks, in which comparisons between explicit
statements are made (Gentner and Landers, 1985; Gentner et al.,
1993; Krawczyk et al., 2004, 2005), the comparisons made by our
economics experts were not always made fully explicit. Indeed,
we frequently encountered instances in which a source or a target
were implied, or not even articulated in the flow of discussion.
This interpretive challenge may have been exacerbated by the
high degree of expertise in our sample group, as some analo-
gies involved inside knowledge that the speaker did not feel was
necessary to clearly articulate in order to meaningfully draw the
comparison to the group.
These observations are offered for several reasons. First, there
are additional questions that can be investigated from these data,
aside from the boundaries of this paper (e.g., Do the within-
category/outside-category comparisons correspond to particular
types of source-target pairs? Does a taxonomy of source categories
emerge from the outside-category analogies in this setting? How
effective did the analogies seem to be in conveying the intended
information?). Second, the rating process involved some inherent
subjectivity; even though inter-rater reliability was rather high,
there were disagreements on specific passages. This is a chal-
lenge inherent in real-world analogical analyses, as the dynamic
and unscripted nature of the interactions can produce text that
is very difficult to interpret outside of the context in which it
was spoken and by an individual who does not have access to
the speaker’s intent. Third, the rating process was further com-
plicated when analogies were embedded in familiar language
constructs—well-known clichés, common metaphors, etc.—and
were not immediately identified as analogies by the raters, as such
phrases have become so conventionalized that their figurative
qualities can be simply overlooked.
We were able to ascertain some of the major purposes
for which analogies are used in economics discussions among
experts. The leading purpose for analogical comparisons was to
provide examples. Good examples from other domains or famil-
iar sources can provide clarity to a target and make the concept
more concrete. In many of the analogies, we observed that experts
tended to either relate an abstracted theoretical model to a more
common situation that occurs in human interactions, or they
did the reverse and described a particular situation as being an
example of what is known to occur within a particular theoreti-
cal game. Experts also made common use of analogies to create
a visual image of a particular concept. Visualization is important
for providing a common ground for the audience and for making
a target domain richer and easier to comprehend. Experts also
used analogies in order to add color or interest to their contri-
butions and to mark a topic as being included within a more
familiar source domain. Given that we conducted this observation
process in an academic setting, our experts may have developed
tendencies to use analogy due to their experiences with teaching,
in which good examples and visual comparisons can be use-
ful for conveying concepts (Richland et al., 2007; Glynn, 2008).
These goals for analogical comparison fit with prior observations
about analogy as being diverse in function (Holyoak and Thagard,
1995), but contrary to several prior scholarly works describing
analogical purpose (Holyoak and Thagard, 1997; Hummel and
Holyoak, 1997) we did not find substantial evidence of new infer-
ences being generated. Rather, the most prevalent use of analogy
in the economics experts was to describe concepts to the group or
to point out similarities between relational systems in either the
real world, or in theoretical constructs.
In addition to these questions, several limitations with regard
to the method and analysis of this study should be noted. The
transcribers were non-experts in economics, but they were cho-
sen to avoid domain bias and reduce the tendency to add their
own interpretation to the passages. Additionally, three of the four
transcribers lacked prior transcription experience in recognizing
analogies, which opened the door for subtle analogies to be over-
looked. We addressed this limitation using a two-phased training
process and a two-person extraction strategy and believe that we
reduced - but may not have eliminated - the likelihood of missed
analogies. While it is possible that some subtle analogies may have
been overlooked, we believe the number to be small enough to not
alter our findings.
Their lack of domain expertise, however, may have con-
tributed to the subjectivity and inconsistency mentioned above.
Furthermore, we did not code the analogies according to any
sort of standard domain taxonomy, as Dunbar (1995) did in his
microbiology laboratory study. Finally, we did not account for
individual differences by examining patterns of analogy use by
specific individuals in the group.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, this study reinforces the strong reliance humans
place on analogies for developing understanding and communi-
cating in natural settings. It contributes valuable evidence that
humans are quite agile in their selection of analogies, drawing
on a mix of shallow and deep comparisons and determining an
effective distance strategy based on the constraints of the domain
and the level of perceived group expertise. Economics faculty and
graduate student experts engaged in scientific discussion were
observed to apply analogies that were more balanced in terms
of categorical distance and structural depth than those observed
in other natural settings. The domain context, problem-solving
goals, and participant expertise of this particular group setting
all appear to be important factors that led to differences in the
magnitudes of depth and distance observed in the earlier stud-
ies. No evidence of an association between the distance and depth
characteristics was found, but distance and purpose appeared to
be related. A number of other questions remain to be answered
about the ways in which analogies are applied in different types of
settings. Future naturalistic analogy research could help to clar-
ify the role on analogical comparisons in real-world settings and
the social sciences appear to provide particularly rich domains for
additional studies.
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